First-Hand:US-USSR Cooperative Program in the Application of Computers to Management

Submitted by A. Michael Noll

February 24, 2025

A few days after I was granted a Ph. D. from the Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn in mid 1971, I took a leave of absence from Bell Labs and went to Washington to be employed on the staff of the Office of Science and Technology (OST) at the Executive Office of the President. The Director of OST was Dr. Edward E. David, Jr., who also served as Science Advisor to President Nixon.

How did I end up in Washington? Months earlier I was at Bell Labs in my office, and the phone rang. It was Dr. William O. Baker (vice president, research) calling me directly. I might have actually stood up. He mentioned that sometimes people at Bell Labs go to Washington, and he asked me how I would respond if such an offer were made to me. I realized he expected an immediate reply. I said that it would be my duty to serve the country. He said that I would be contacted in a few days by Dr. David’s office in Washington. I then went to see Dr. David, and the hiring process was initiated. It included a security clearance background check that took a few months, although I started as a consultant until this check was completed.

I had a large corner office on the second floor of the Old Executive Office Building, adjacent to the White House West Wing. As a newly minted Ph.D. and research engineer, I had no experience in the bureaucracy of Washington – I was in over my head. But I would in a year negotiate an agreement with the Soviets regarding the use of computers in management. I learned much “on the job.”

One of my “teachers” at OST was Dr. Norman P. Neureiter, who was on loan from the State Department and was responsible at OST for international S&T matters. He involved me in exports of computers to the Soviet Union and took me as his computer expert to meetings with State, Commerce, and Defense debating computer exports to the USSR. I learned much of the politics and haziness of Washington, in which nothing was ever a definite clear decision.

Dr. Henry Kissinger wanted to collapse the Soviet Union by opening it up to more communication and interaction with the United States. As part of his grand plan, a broad science agreement was signed in Moscow between the US and USSR. Dr. David and his secretary went to Moscow to negotiate the overall agreement. His secretary had been warned that the Soviets might attempt to compromise her, so she did not answer the door when a male attempted to see her. The Soviets had a history of using sex to compromise victims that could then be blackmailed and used.

Dr. David returned to Washington, and the OST was tasked with the specifics of the science agreement. One of the areas of cooperation was the application of computers to management. The Soviets lusted for US computer technology, but the emphasis of this cooperative area was the application of computers to management and efficiency – not computers per se or computer technology. The emphasis was to be academics working together across the US-USSR.

A coordinating committee was created, co-chaired by a Soviet, Dr. Bashir Rameev, and by me. Dr. Rameev was quite senior, with many accomplishments and even a Stalin Prize. I worked on choosing the US members of the joint committee. I remember that I choose Dr. Harvey McMains, who working in cooperate planning at AT&T. Dr. William O. Baker suggested a possible member, but my vetting of this candidate was negative, and thus was not asked to join.

The Soviets flew to the US for a joint meeting of the committee. They arrived at Kennedy Airport, where I met initially with them. It was cold, and they all had heavy coats. A woman, whose Russian name was “mushroom” in English, accompanied them. We were surprised that the KGB was now using women in such roles to watch the Soviet members. I was concerned that a Soviet member might decide to defect, and that this would embarrass the White House’s overall plan – but this did not happen.

We arranged for the Soviets to stay at a hotel in Manhattan. I stayed there a night too, but it was not that great a hotel. Arrangements were made for the Soviets to see examples of the use of computers in management, and one place was a steel factory near Baltimore. I did not go on these visits.

We hosted a dinner for the joint committee. I had to make a toast – something I had never done before, and which made me nervous. The joint committee met at the State Department with simultaneous interpretation. I was instructed to listen on the earphone to the Russian, and wait for a pause before continuing myself to speak to give the interpreter time to catch up with me.

A reception was hosted at the Soviet Embassy for the full committee. The door to the building seemed strong enough to stop a tank. Two security men were in the lobby, and seemed strong enough to stop an invading army. There was a flight of stairs going up to the reception room, which was elaborately gilded in gold with a table for drinks and food. I had been warned not to be speaking to a Soviet without my own interpreter present. But frequently my interpreter was not there. I had asked an embassy person whether I could see the communications room in the Embassy. He initially said “yes,” but I was not given access.

A Soviet embassy person asked me how a person so young as me could be the co-chair of the joint committee. I had also been told earlier by US intelligence that the Soviets seemed confused by who I was and could discover little about me.

We had a person who was hired to assist the Soviets while they were in US – that person would telephone me each evening to inform me of daily details. Their last day in the US was scheduled to be a free day in New York City, mostly for shopping before returning to the USSR.

Dr. Rameev remained to finalize and sign the agreement. He and I met at the State Department. A draft of the agreement had been prepared, but he wanted significant changes, so that the US government would order the computer industry to work with the Soviets – rather than the agreed upon emphasis of academic cooperation and use of computers in management. I said in English that the US could not agree with that, and accordingly we would need to work this out over the coming months. This was translated into Russian. Dr. Rameev replied in Russian, and his reply was translated, as he could not return to Russia without a signed agreement. I realized that I had the freedom to return to my boss (Dr. David) saying we had failed to obtain a final signed agreement – but Dr. Rameev did not have that freedom. Dr. Rameev signed the agreement as it was originally drafted. In my mind, I saw the US flag flying in the breeze. Months later, a new Soviet co-chair appeared, and I worried about Dr. Ramee’s fate – but a few years later I was told he had survived. Negotiation with the Soviets can be a tricky affair -- trust is not present.

A few days after the Soviets had left, I received a telephone call from a CIA person who asked me whether any of the Soviets had Western leanings. I was annoyed that the CIA would attempt to use a White House initiative for its purposes, and I replied that they were all loyal Soviets.

Now, decades later, I realize that Dr. Rameev was a techie like me with no experience in diplomacy and negotiation. He probably had been ordered in Moscow to obtain a signed agreement. He too was in over his head.

I recall a Soviet expecting that the US government could order companies to cooperate with the Soviets and sell them computers. I explained that in the US, the government does not tell industry what to do – we do not have than kind of centralized planning and control. But as I said that, I also realized that all our regulations might be seen as government control. I guess it is all a matter of how much control is exerted. My personal belief is that the less control and support, the better for free business and competition.

I knew that the OST could not implement and manage the program. Accordingly, I arranged for its management to be the responsibility of the National Science Foundation (NSF), with funding allocated by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). This transfer was implemented, and my role was over.